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On defining moral enhancement: a clarificatory taxonomy 1 
 2 
ABSTRACT 3 
Recently there has been some discussion concerning a particular type of enhancement, namely ‘moral 4 
enhancement’. However, there is no consensus on what precisely constitutes moral enhancement, and 5 
as a result the concept is used and defined in a wide variety of ways. In this article, we develop a 6 
clarificatory taxonomy of these definitions and we identify the criteria that are used to delineate the 7 
concept. We think that the current definitions can be distinguished from each other by the criteria used 8 
for determining whether an intervention is indeed moral enhancement. For example, some definitions 9 
are broad and include moral enhancement by any means, while other definitions focus only on moral 10 
enhancement by means of specific types of intervention (e.g. biomedical or genetic interventions). 11 
Moreover, for some definitions it suffices for an intervention to be aimed or intended to morally 12 
enhance a person, while other definitions only refer to ‘moral enhancement’ in relation to interventions 13 
that are actually effective. For all these differences in definitions we discuss some of their (more 14 
normative) implications. This shows that definitions are significantly less descriptive and more 15 
normative than they are regularly portrayed to be. We therefore hope that the taxonomy developed in 16 
this paper and the comments on the implications for the normative debate of the variety of definitions 17 
will provide conceptual clarity in a complex and highly interesting debate. 18 
 19 
INTRODUCTION 20 
The debate about enhancing human traits has been raging for some decades, and more recently there 21 
has been some discussion concerning one particular category of enhancement, namely ‘moral 22 
enhancement’. What is at issue in moral enhancement is not the improvement of physical and/or 23 
cognitive capacities, but improvement in the way in which we act or reflect morally. Concerns have 24 
been voiced that tinkering with our beliefs of what is right and wrong, or our motivation to act rightly 25 
or wrongly, might be to open a Pandora’s box that could lead to unforeseen and potentially disastrous 26 
consequences [1-3]. Others praise moral enhancement as an essential step in guaranteeing even the 27 
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very survival of the human race as the potential for doing great harm (e.g. with biological or other 28 
weapons of mass destruction) continues to increase [4-7]. 29 
 30 
Although the debate is of recent date, ‘moral enhancement’ or ‘moral bioenhancement’ has already 31 
become an established concept. Nevertheless, it is far from clear what precisely constitutes moral 32 
enhancement. Different authors use different definitions or meanings of  term. Existing definitions can 33 
differ to such a degree that a particular intervention would constitute or result in moral enhancement 34 
according to one definition, but not according to another. However, even though many different 35 
definitions of the term exist, this is not always acknowledged in the debate. In this respect, John Shook 36 
has stated: 37 
Too many discussions are proceeding as if both the meaning and the possibility of moral 38 
enhancement were already widely understood and agreed upon. (…) Asking such questions, 39 
and offering answers, depend on assigning some sense or another to “moral enhancement.” 40 
However, clear and precise definitions of “moral enhancement” are not to be found; what has 41 
been called “moral” enhancement ranges from feeling empathic concern to increasing personal 42 
responsibility all the way to heightening respect for global fairness [8, p.3] 43 
 44 
And also: 45 
anyone using the term ‘moral enhancement’ as if everyone knows what is meant must either 46 
be simplifying matters to the point of negligence, or trying to speak only to those already in 47 
local moral consensus. [8, p.4] 48 
 49 
We therefore believe that it is important to chart the different types of definition and so develop a 50 
taxonomy of existing definitions or uses of the concept of moral enhancement. We focus on a number 51 
of criteria for what counts as a moral enhancement that are included in some definitions but are not 52 
included or are included, but in a different form, in others. Whenever possible, we use definitions 53 
given by authors in their articles and stay as close as possible to the author’s wording. However, not 54 
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every author gives an explicit definition, and in some cases we must therefore focus on how these 55 
authors use the concept of moral enhancement and in what context. 56 
 57 
Of course, creating a descriptive taxonomy can only be a first step in the debate on moral 58 
enhancement, as is clear from the quotes from Shook given above. Another issue that is rarely 59 
acknowledged in the debate on moral enhancement, is that behind the seeming neutrality of defining 60 
the concept, there often lie philosophical battles as to what constitutes morality and what it means to 61 
act morally. In this paper we will therefore also discuss the (normative) implications of using certain 62 
types of definition and of including or excluding certain elements from the definition. Our aim is to go 63 
beyond the simplification and local moral consensus described by Shook above, to chart the 64 
complexity of the concept and its implications for the normative debate on the permissibility or 65 
desirability of specific interventions aimed at moral enhancement. 66 
 67 
We believe a descriptive taxonomy, combined with a discussion of some of the main implications of 68 
using certain types of definition, are important tools for anyone wishing to conduct a normative 69 
analysis of the ethical desirability of moral enhancement. We will distinguish different definitions of 70 
moral enhancement based on the criteria they use for determining whether a certain intervention is 71 
indeed a moral enhancement. We each time focus on a single criterion whereby we discuss (1) how 72 
definitions can be distinguished based on their inclusion or exclusion of this criterion, and (2) what the 73 
possible (normative) implications are of including or excluding it. For example, some definitions are 74 
broad and include moral enhancement by any means, while other definitions focus only on moral 75 
enhancement by means of specific types of intervention (e.g. biomedical or genetic interventions). 76 
Another element is that some definitions consider as moral enhancement those interventions that 77 
change a person’s moral behaviour while for other definitions an intervention can only be seen as a 78 
moral enhancement when it targets a person’s moral capacities. However, in this paper we will take no 79 
position on the definitions or criteria we prefer or disagree with, and we will not formulate definitions 80 
of our own. 81 
 82 
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FOCUS ON THE INTERVENTION OR ON THE INDIVIDUAL 83 
When comparing different definitions or uses of the concept of ‘moral enhancement’, one has to make 84 
sure one is not comparing apples and oranges. Many publications touch on the question: what is moral 85 
enhancement? However, this question seems to be understood in two different ways. Some authors 86 
formulate the question as: when can a certain intervention be considered a moral enhancement?. In 87 
doing so, they focus on the criteria that need to be met by the interventional process. David DeGrazia, 88 
for example, seems to understand moral enhancements as: 89 
interventions that are intended to improve our moral capacities such as our capacities for 90 
sympathy and fairness’. [9, p.1] 91 
 92 
Other commentators focus less on the intervention, and seem to understand the question of what is 93 
moral enhancement as: when can an individual be seen to have been morally enhanced or what does it 94 
mean for an individual to be morally enhanced?. James Hughes, for example, argues for a conception 95 
of moral enhancement that focuses heavily on the individual rather than the intervention: 96 
 Moral enhancement is not just the jacking up of virtue with neurochemicals. It is more broadly 97 
taking conscious control of our lives to build the kind of character we want to have. [10, p.4] 98 
 99 
It will be clear that focusing on the intervention rather than on the individual allows consideration of 100 
the efficacy of the intervention in particular cases to be deferred, and even that the nature of the moral 101 
improvement becomes less central. 102 
 103 
BROAD VERSUS MORE SPECIFIC INTERVENTIONAL MEANS 104 
Another difference is that some authors [8; 11-13] use moral enhancement as a broad concept that 105 
covers any practice that causes or is intended to cause a change in the functioning of moral capacities, 106 
with types of interventions ranging from non-invasive (e.g. moral education) to highly invasive (e.g. 107 
deep brain stimulation or brain surgery). Others [4, 14] are more specific and focus on moral 108 
bioenhancement which they seem to understand as ‘moral enhancement by biomedical and genetic 109 
means’ [4, p.162]. Hence, these authors make explicit that they only focus on certain (invasive) means 110 
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for enhancement, thereby leaving out such interventions as moral education or talk therapy. A 111 
particular example of a specific focus can be found in an article by Mark Walker which discusses 112 
‘enhancing genetic virtue’, a specific way of morally enhancing individuals: 113 
Engineering genetic virtue (...) would mean promoting genes that influence the acquisition of 114 
the virtues. [15, p.26] 115 
 116 
It is clear that certain (more invasive) interventions are more controversial than other (less invasive) 117 
ones such as talk therapy and moral education. When one limits moral enhancement to more 118 
controversial cases, it is clear that when it comes to arguing for the ethical desirability of moral 119 
enhancement, a stronger justification will be needed.  120 
 121 
Moreover, using a broad conception of moral enhancement seems to imply that interventions such as 122 
moral education and neurological interventions do not differ in principle (as they are both captured 123 
under the heading of ‘moral enhancement’), but solely in terms of their practical implications/effects, 124 
for example, invasiveness or effectiveness. Using the concept of moral enhancement for all 125 
interventions or only for those interventions that are (most) invasive, can serve to bias the normative 126 
debate towards or away from a conclusion of permissibility or desirability. 127 
 128 
ENHANCING INDIVIDUALS VERSUS ENHANCING HUMANITY 129 
Definitions can differ in what they consider to be the target of moral enhancement. Most definitions 130 
stipulate that ‘moral enhancement’ refers to interventions that are used on individual persons. For 131 
example, Tom Douglas [16,17] defines moral enhancement as: 132 
 interventions that will expectably leave an individual with more moral (viz. morally better) 133 
motives or behaviour than she would otherwise have had. [17, p.3] 134 
 135 
Some commentators, however, use a definition that also seems to include interventions that operate on 136 
groups of persons, or even on society and/or humanity in general. This is the case, for example, for  137 
Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu who discuss enhancing ‘the moral character of humanity’ [4]. 138 
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 139 
To illustrate the difference between morally enhancing individuals and morally enhancing society, 140 
consider the following imaginary case: 141 
A country’s government passes a law that requires that for every case of In Vitro Fertilisation, 142 
only embryos that do not possess a certain set of genes associated with a higher risk of 143 
developing anti-social personality disorder are suitable candidates for implantation. 144 
 145 
In this case one could claim – following well-known arguments made by Derek Parfit in his Reasons 146 
and Persons [18] – that no individual would end up with better motives or behaviour than she would 147 
otherwise have had (as she either would not have been born or would have been chosen anyway), yet 148 
the society she lives in might end up with more people behaving morally. The theoretical possibility of 149 
such moral enhancement through genetic selection has been discussed by Walker [15] and Halley 150 
Faust [19]. According to definitions such as the one mentioned above by Douglas, such a program of 151 
pre-implantation genetic testing and selection would simply not be considered to be a moral 152 
enhancement as, following arguments voiced by Parfit, no individual could claim to be morally 153 
improved and so would fall outside the normative debate in this field. As with the previous section, 154 
excluding the ‘difficult’ and including the ‘easy’ both have implications for the debate. 155 
 156 
These definitions, covering the individual alone or covering society as well, thus also have relevant 157 
implications. For justifying moral enhancement applied solely to individuals, justifications related to 158 
autonomy and personal benefit might suffice. However, in justifying moral enhancement on a societal 159 
level one would need to turn to other justifications such as issues of justice or of achieving a common 160 
good. Moreover, concerns about altering human nature would then come into view as well 161 
 162 
MORAL TREATMENT VERSUS MORAL ENHANCEMENT 163 
Many definitions understand moral enhancement as any form of moral improvement, regardless of 164 
whether it involves an improvement towards average functioning of moral capacities or one towards 165 
above average functioning. However, there are exceptions. Nicholas Agar, for example, has explicitly 166 
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criticised the definition used by DeGrazia (quoted above) for not differentiating between moral 167 
enhancement as improvement (something Agar considers to be synonymous with moral therapy), and 168 
moral enhancement beyond human norms.1 For Agar, an example of moral therapy would be 169 
‘endowing the likes of John Wayne Gacy or Ted Bundy with a normal sensitivity to suffering’ [21, 170 
p.73]. Moral enhancement, on the other hand, ‘has the purpose of boosting responsiveness to ethical or 171 
moral reasons to levels beyond that considered normal for human beings’ [21, p.73]. For Agar, moral 172 
enhancement refers exclusively to interventions that raise people to a higher level of functioning of 173 
moral capacities that is infrequently observed among humans or even to levels beyond those ever 174 
observed. Agar considers moral therapy and moral enhancement to be sufficiently different not to be 175 
lumped together under one term. 176 
 177 
Likewise, Dorothee Horstkötter et al. argue that bringing people to average levels of moral reflection 178 
or behaviour is medical treatment and not enhancement. They claim that: 179 
 if there is a health problem, medical treatment is the reasonable reaction, while enhancement, 180 
either moral or otherwise, does not arise [22, p.27] 181 
 182 
In order to be able to distinguish moral treatment from moral enhancement in this way, one needs to 183 
determine what constitutes an average or normal level of functioning of moral capacities or behaviour. 184 
Every intervention that brings a person to this average level would then be treatment, while 185 
enhancement would consist of improving beyond this average level. To put this somewhat more 186 
analytically, those who maintain a difference between treating and enhancing, have to be able, at least 187 
theoretically, to distinguish: 188 
1) An intervention (X), used on a person or group with a below average functioning of moral 189 
capacities and/or behaviour (MBA) that is intended to raise or succeeds at raising this person’s 190 
or group’s functioning of moral capacities and/or behaviour to an average level (MA) 191 
                                                      
1
 The debate on a possible distinction between ‘treatment’ and ‘enhancement’ is, of course, by no means exclusive to the 
moral enhancement debate. Many commentators have already discussed the relevance or irrelevance of such a distinction for 
the general debate on enhancement [20]. 
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 192 
2) An intervention (Y), used on a person or group with an average functioning of moral 193 
capacities and/or behaviour (MA) that is intended to raise or succeeds at raising this person’s 194 
or group’s functioning of moral capacities and/or behaviour to an above average level (MAA) 195 
 196 
An intervention X could then be considered ‘treatment’, while interventions of type Y could then be 197 
labelled as ‘enhancement’. Naturally, there is also a third possibility which is: 198 
3) An intervention (Z), used on a person or group with a below average functioning of moral 199 
capacities and/or behaviour (MBA) that is intended to raise or succeeds at raising this person’s 200 
or group’s functioning of moral capacities and/or behaviour to an above average level (MAA) 201 
 202 
Classifying interventions of type Z is more difficult as this intervention has both a treatment and an 203 
enhancement aspect to it. 204 
 205 
Put in a schematic way this becomes: 206 
 207 
  208 
 209 
 210 
  211 
However, spelling out the cut-off point between moral therapy and moral enhancement may often be 212 
next to impossible. MBA, MA, and MAA do not represent single and generally agreed upon levels of 213 
moral capacities. There is a continuum that ranges from below average functioning of moral capacities 214 
through to above average functioning. On this continuum, different cut-off points could be made as to 215 
what falls within average functioning (and hence what falls outside), depending on how many standard 216 
deviations from average one allows for an individual to still be considered as having normally 217 
functioning moral capacities. As there is no objective way of determining what falls within the range 218 
of ‘normal’ moral behaviour or functioning of moral capacities, every choice of cut-off point is, 219 
X 
MBA MA MAA 
Y 
Z 
Scheme 1: Three types of interventions 
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necessarily, a normative one. Even the question as to what constitutes ‘moral capacities’ has no 220 
straightforward answer.2 Our proposed scheme only purports to create conceptual clarity, hence we 221 
take no position as to where we believe the cut-off point should lie. We limit ourselves to pointing out 222 
that different cut-off points can be made and that our scheme can be applied regardless of which cut-223 
off point one adopts. 224 
 225 
Moreover, distinguishing moral treatment from moral enhancement raises other issues as it brings 226 
morality within the medical domain. What seems to be implied by distinguishing moral enhancement 227 
from moral treatment is not only that some people who lack in moral behaviour or capacities are 228 
suffering from a disease or health problem, but also that they can sometimes be treated or cured. This 229 
raises the question of whether, and if so under which conditions, certain forms of immorality should be 230 
medicalized. 231 
 232 
When one distinguishes moral treatment from moral enhancement, it also becomes impossible to 233 
determine whether a particular intervention, in itself, is a moral enhancement or not. It is possible that 234 
exactly the same intervention could be used in one case to raise a person to an average functioning of 235 
moral capacities (intervention X), and in another case to raise a person to an above average 236 
functioning of moral capacity (intervention Y). A single intervention could thus be a moral therapy or 237 
a moral enhancement depending on the situation in which it is used. 238 
 239 
Making a distinction between moral treatment and moral enhancement requires taking a normative 240 
stance on what constitutes average or normal moral behaviour or average or normal moral capacities. 241 
Even if one does not wish to make this distinction, however, claims about what constitutes an 242 
                                                      
2
 One might understand ‘moral capacities’ as being those capacities we actually use when making moral decisions (which 
capacities these are, is researched in moral psychology and neuroscience). [For example, a recent review on the neurobiology 
of morality argues that it is most plausible to depict moral processes as requiring the engagement of both emotional and 
cognitive neural networks) [29].] However, ‘moral capacities’ might also be used to refer to those capacities one believes one 
should use when making moral decisions, or capacities that, when used more or better, would lead to better moral decisions. 
These capacities might, for example, constitute the capacity for sympathy and fairness [9] or cognitive capacities [1]. 
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improvement of moral capacities or behaviour – which is just as much up for debate – are inevitable. If 243 
one leaves out standards on what it means to improve moral behaviour or capacities, the concept 244 
becomes indistinguishable from mere mental modification, as has been noted by Filippo Santoni de 245 
Sio et al. [28]. 246 
 247 
Again, as noted in earlier sections, limiting or extending the definition of moral enhancement by 248 
excluding the controversial or by including the uncontroversial clearly has implications for the 249 
normative debate. 250 
 251 
INTENDED VERSUS EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 252 
Another element of difference between existing definitions concerns the question whether moral 253 
enhancement only refers to interventions that are successful at improving a subject’s moral capacity, or 254 
whether it also includes interventions that are merely intended or expected to improve moral capacity 255 
(regardless of whether they actually do). 256 
 257 
The abovementioned definitions by DeGrazia [9] and Douglas [17] include cases of intended or 258 
expected but failed interventions. For them, what is important in determining whether an intervention 259 
is to be considered a moral enhancement is the intention with which the intervention is used. 260 
 261 
John Harris, however, has reacted to this and has stated: 262 
I do not define enhancements in terms of the intention or the motivation of those who produce 263 
them but rather in terms of their effect. [23, p.1] 264 
 265 
Another example is Shook [8], for whom an intervention can be considered a moral enhancement if it 266 
affects an individual’s moral beliefs, moral motives and/or moral behaviour. Thus, moral enhancement 267 
should do one or more of five things: 268 
1) Enhance a person’s sensitivity to moral features of situations – resulting in heightened 269 
moral appreciation 270 
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2) Enhance a person’s thoughtfulness about doing the right thing – resulting in stronger moral 271 
decisions 272 
3) Enhance a person’s moral judgments that get the right moral answer – resulting in more 273 
correct moral judgments 274 
4) Enhance a person’s motivated choice to do what moral judgment indicates – resulting in 275 
improved moral intentions 276 
5) Enhance a person’s volitional power to act upon a moral intention – resulting in more will 277 
power [8, p.6; our italics] 278 
 279 
Hence, for Harris and Shook an intervention that is intended to morally enhance a person, but fails to 280 
affect that person’s moral reflection process or behaviour, is not a moral enhancement. This difference 281 
between moral enhancement as an intervention intended to enhance versus an intervention successful 282 
in achieving enhancement becomes relevant when it comes to moral justification. If, as Shook’s 283 
definition seems to imply, an intervention can only be labelled a moral enhancement if it has a positive 284 
effect then one important reason to oppose moral enhancement is eliminated. Indeed, all problematic 285 
cases where no enhancement is reached or a person is left less moral than before the intervention, 286 
would quite simply not be considered cases of moral enhancement at all. This way of justifying moral 287 
enhancement would avoid all debate concerning potential risks, side-effects, etc. 288 
 289 
CAPACITIES-ORIENTED VERSUS BEHAVIOUR-ORIENTED INTERVENTIONS 290 
Some commentators in the moral enhancement debate label a certain intervention a moral 291 
enhancement depending on its (real or intended) effect on a person’s behaviour. Others see moral 292 
enhancements as interventions that target or are intended to target a person’s capacities of moral 293 
reflection. We shall refer to this difference as the difference between a behaviour-oriented and a 294 
capacities-oriented intervention. 295 
 296 
Keeping in mind that an intervention of moral enhancement can target a person’s behaviour or their 297 
capacities of moral reflection, any intervention can have one of four results. It can result in a person: 298 
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 299 
 300 
 301 
 302 
 303 
 304 
Scheme 2: four possible results 305 
 306 
Currently existing definitions differ as to the question in which of the quadrants in the scheme given 307 
above one can find cases of moral enhancement. To clarify this difference, imagine the following 308 
extreme case: 309 
Jack is a man with paedophilic urges who is currently incarcerated for having sexually 310 
molested a child. Despite a large amount of therapy, Jack fails to see what is wrong with him 311 
interacting with children in a sexual way. It is therefore decided to sedate Jack against his will 312 
and bring him to a surgery room. Neurosurgeons implant a chip (call this intervention X) that 313 
will stop Jack from molesting children. 314 
 315 
For this case, we need not deal with the question whether this intervention is ethically justified; we 316 
will merely focus on the question whether we should consider this to be ‘moral enhancement’. This is 317 
a case similar to one suggested by DeGrazia [9] who considers this an extreme form of ‘moral 318 
bioenhancement’. In identifying which interventions can be labelled moral enhancements, some 319 
commentators rely heavily or solely on the intervention’s achieved (or intended) effect on a person’s 320 
behaviour [e.g. 17]. For them, intervention X, from the imaginary case above, changes Jack’s 321 
behaviour for the better and hence would be considered moral enhancement, regardless of whether the 322 
intervention also affects Jack’s moral capacities. Therefore, for those commentators defining moral 323 
enhancement in a behaviour-oriented way, interventions of moral enhancement can be found only in 324 
the right half of scheme 2 above (reflecting the same and acting differently & reflecting differently and 325 
acting differently).  326 
Reflecting the same 
Acting the same 
Reflecting the same 
Acting differently 
Reflecting differently 
Acting the same 
Reflecting differently 
Acting differently 
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 327 
It is also clear that the requirement for successful behaviour change would not suffice to label an 328 
intervention a moral enhancement by certain other authors, but instead would be categorised by them 329 
as a form of behaviour control (e.g. Harris) or moral therapy (e.g. Agar). Such an intervention could 330 
either fall on the side of mere behaviour control, or on the side of moral therapy, depending on the 331 
individual undergoing the intervention (e.g. an individual with or without a sexual disorder) and the 332 
goal in question (e.g. as a means of rehabilitation or mere crime reduction by the criminal justice 333 
system). Such differences in definition have implications for the acceptability of certain moral 334 
enhancement interventions, and may render certain interventions more acceptable if labelled as a 335 
moral enhancement rather than as a form of behaviour control. The latter, if misused, may result in 336 
ethically dubious practices (cf. the chemical castration laws of certain US States) (see Focquaert [30]). 337 
Hence, depending on one’s definition, the term moral enhancement could be knowingly or 338 
unknowingly misused to justify practices that would otherwise be deemed immoral.  339 
 340 
Indeed, others understand moral enhancement in a different way, and argue that it does matter whether 341 
or not an intervention affects the functioning of the subject’s moral capacities. True, they might say, in 342 
the imaginary case Jack will no longer molest children, but if the implant is put in place against Jack’s 343 
will and his subsequent actions do not stem from a moral judgment on Jack’s behalf concerning what 344 
is morally right and wrong, this is not a moral enhancement.3 In their view, making someone ‘more 345 
moral’ involves more than merely altering a person’s behaviour. Or, as Harris puts it: 346 
I take moral enhancement to involve enhancing our ability to think ethically (...), not 347 
manipulating the probability of some reacting in ways that others deem ethical. [23, p.3; italics 348 
in original] 349 
 350 
                                                      
3
 Of course, again, we should not mistake the debate on what to call these interventions with debate on the ethical validity of 
such interventions. Authors such as Harris can consistently claim: (1) that an intervention such as the one performed on Jack 
is not a moral enhancement, and (2) that there might be some cases where such an intervention is morally justified. 
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Fabrice Jotterand has also criticised the one-sidedness of focussing on behaviour. He argues that most 351 
moral neuroenhancement is unlikely to morally enhance people in the true sense of the term and notes 352 
that: 353 
While the manipulation of moral emotions might change the behavior of an individual, it does 354 
not provide any content, for example, norms or values to guide one’s behavioral response. [24, 355 
p.6] 356 
 357 
In a similar vein, William Simkulet argues that: 358 
(i) forcing agents to act rightly, (ii) preventing agents from acting wrongly, and (iii) making it 359 
harder for moral agents to act wrongly fail to constitute genuine moral enhancement. [25, 360 
p.17] 361 
 362 
For these commentators, as well as for those who use similar lines of argumentation [e.g. 13, 26], the 363 
criterion for whether an intervention constitutes a moral enhancement is not behaviour, but whether 364 
the intervention affects or improves an individual’s capacities for moral reflection. They situate moral 365 
enhancements in the lower half of scheme 2 (reflecting differently and acting the same & reflecting 366 
differently and acting differently).  367 
 368 
Defining moral enhancement in a capacities-oriented way has some important consequences. If moral 369 
enhancement indeed merely refers to interventions that improve a subject’s capacities for moral 370 
reflection, then it is possible to morally enhance an individual without this resulting into improved 371 
moral behaviour. Moreover, it is not unlikely that, for example, when one improves an individual’s 372 
moral beliefs, this does not result in improved moral behaviour, as it is well known that knowing the 373 
good does not automatically lead to doing the right thing. This also means that if one uses a 374 
capacities-oriented definition of moral enhancement, actually measuring whether and to what degree 375 
an individual is morally enhanced is difficult, since it would require an assessment of a person’s 376 
reflection processes. 377 
 378 
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As such, the debate on whether moral enhancement can be better understood in a capacities-oriented 379 
or a behaviour-oriented way is often only the surface of more fundamental debates, for example on 380 
how important freedom is for moral action. Can behaviour be called moral if it is not free? Indeed, 381 
only accepting changes in behaviour as a criterion for determining what constitutes moral 382 
enhancement leads one to claiming that certain interventions that cause an individual to display moral 383 
behaviour in an automatic manner, are examples of moral enhancements. A relevant thought 384 
experiment in this respect is that of the ‘God Machine’, formulated by Savulescu and Persson [30], a 385 
machine that monitors everyone’s desires and intentions, and which intervenes every time a person 386 
forms an intention to perform a great moral evil (e.g. murder or rape) by simply changing that person’s 387 
intention and thus her behaviour. In this scenario, people are still able to choose to do the right thing 388 
(i.e. not to murder or rape), but unable to chose or perform moral evil. Those authors defending a 389 
capacities-oriented approach might object that a person who initially intends to murder or rape but has 390 
his mind changed by the God Machine is not at all morally enhanced, as his subsequent decision to act 391 
or not act on that intention would not be free or autonomous.4 For authors such as Harris, an 392 
intervention can only be a moral enhancement if it leaves the freedom to fall, i.e. to do the wrong 393 
thing. Of course, focussing solely on the (intended or achieved) effect of interventions on a person’s 394 
capacities for moral reflection, may commit one to calling certain interventions moral enhancements 395 
even though they may in no way change a person’s behaviour.  396 
 397 
One way to address this would be to combine the capacities-oriented and the behaviour-oriented 398 
approaches. For example, one might say that an intervention is a moral enhancement if it changes 399 
behaviour or if it changes one’s capacities for moral reflection. This broadens the field of what is 400 
moral enhancement (as it would only exclude interventions in the upper left corner of scheme 2 - i.e. 401 
reflecting the same and acting the same), but, of course, it also combines the problems mentioned 402 
earlier.  403 
                                                      
4
 In this respect, Savulescu and Persson do mention at the end of their paper that ‘[s]uch interventions and such control are 
not plausibly moral enhancements of that person’ [30, p.417]. They mainly argue for the God Machine on the grounds that 
there would be many positive effects and as such their view perhaps does not differ that much from authors such as Harris. 
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 404 
Another possible response would be to say that an intervention is only a moral enhancement if it 405 
changes behaviour and it changes one’s capacities for moral reflection. This allows one to avoid the 406 
problems mentioned earlier, but of course it also narrows the scope of moral enhancement. For, 407 
according to this way of delineating the concept, interventions of moral enhancement can only be 408 
found in the lower right corner of scheme 2 (i.e reflecting differently and acting differently). In some 409 
of his statements, Harris seems to be defending this position, for example when he says: 410 
 It seems to me that moral enhancement, properly so called, must not only make the doing of 411 
good or right actions more probable and the doing of bad ones less likely, but must also 412 
include the understanding of what constitutes right and wrong action. [23, p.172; our italics] 413 
 414 
ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT VERSUS PASSIVE RECEIVING 415 
At the heart of the capacities-oriented versus behaviour-oriented debate mentioned above lies the 416 
question of what is or should be targeted with moral enhancements - moral capacities, moral 417 
behaviour, either one of them, or both. This is not the same as another distinction that is made in the 418 
moral enhancement debate, namely that between enhancement by means of a process requiring active 419 
involvement on behalf of the individual it is used on, and enhancement in which the subject of the 420 
intervention is a passive recipient. This distinction does not concern the target of a moral 421 
enhancement, but rather the way in which the enhancement is achieved. A moral enhancement by way 422 
of active involvement would then be an enhancement requiring conscious mental processes in the 423 
subject as a means to achieve its result. Moral education would be a classical example. In contrast, 424 
moral enhancement involving passive receiving would either be enhancement in an immediate way 425 
where no active involvement was possible (e.g. a pill with immediate effect) or enhancement by way 426 
of a process that required no deliberate involvement of the recipient (e.g. classical conditioning).  427 
 428 
This distinction is relevant since, for some authors, the goal of moral enhancement is for individuals to 429 
become more virtuous, and often these authors follow Aristotle in claiming that becoming virtuous is 430 
always a conscious and deliberate process, where the way to becoming virtuous is just as essential as 431 
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the result (being virtuous). Chris Zarpantine talks about ‘the thorny and arduous path of moral 432 
progress’ [27, p.141], while Jotterand states: 433 
Virtue is a behavioral habit under the supervision of reason that can be taught and learned. The 434 
control and manipulation of moral emotions by technological means reduce the human mind to 435 
neurochemical processes and threaten the very essence of moral agency, that is, autonomy. 436 
[24, p.7] 437 
 438 
This way of thinking about moral enhancement may lead some commentators to reject passive ways of 439 
enhancement as examples of genuine moral enhancement. 440 
 441 
Interestingly, the distinction between moral enhancement by means of an active process and passive 442 
moral enhancement can sometimes be used to complement the capacities-oriented versus behaviour-443 
oriented debate. Among the interventions that target the functioning of a person’s moral capacities, 444 
one could distinguish those interventions that do so using an active process (e.g. moral education) 445 
from those that do so in a passive way (e.g. a pill to clear up one’s moral reflection). However, 446 
interventions that solely target a person’s behaviour, will generally do so in a passive way (e.g. 447 
implants to make a person exhibit a certain behaviour), as moral enhancement by means of active 448 
involvement requires conscious mental processes and, unless the subject is simply trying to learn how 449 
to pass himself off as a moral person, will thus always also affect the person’s capacities for moral 450 
reflection. 451 
 452 
Whether one thinks of moral enhancement as a process requiring active involvement or as (also) 453 
covering more passive ways of changing capacities and/or behaviour, has important implications. It 454 
matters with regard to the relation between the person (or group) doing the enhancing and the person 455 
(or group) being enhanced and the voluntariness of the enhancement. In moral interventions requiring 456 
active involvement, the person being enhanced is at least aware of the process, is given an important 457 
role and, most likely, is free to stop the process as her cooperation is essential. For more passive 458 
interventions, it is possible to enhance a person against their will or even without them knowing they 459 
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are being morally enhanced, which is clearly morally problematic. For these reasons, interventions of 460 
moral enhancement that do not require active involvement of the person being enhanced will most 461 
likely be more controversial. 462 
  463 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 464 
In this paper we have tried to show that the term ‘moral enhancement’ is used in ways that cover a 465 
large variety of different practices. First we examined and made explicit the different ways in which 466 
the concept is used and defined, and we identified the criteria that are used to delineate the concept. 467 
Next we showed that, despite claims of being descriptive, it is often well nigh impossible to separate a 468 
definition’s descriptive content from its normative content. While some differences, have relatively 469 
limited implications, perhaps simply in skewing the normative debate, other differences have more 470 
far-reaching implications and are revealing of underlying normative theories or positions. 471 
 472 
Particular implications that result from the choices made when faced with the alternative definitions 473 
identified in the preceding sections can be summarised as follows:  474 
(1) Broad versus specific means of moral enhancement carry implications with regard to the 475 
invasiveness and practical effects of the intervention in question. More invasive interventions clearly 476 
need a stronger justification. Moreover, definitions including broad means of moral enhancement may 477 
obscure the often-voiced concern that biomedical means of enhancement pose a greater threat to 478 
concepts of authenticity and identity compared to non-biomedical means.  479 
(2) Conceptualizing moral enhancement on an individual level versus a level which includes society 480 
has implications for its justification. For example, potential instances of invasive societal moral 481 
enhancement will need greater justification compared to individual level and non-invasive societal 482 
enhancements. Both specific safeguards pertaining to the rights and needs of the individual and a 483 
justification pertaining to the rights and needs of society are likely to be required in the first case. 484 
Certain less invasive interventions, such as moral education, may on the other hand be decided 485 
through a democratic mandate and may not necessarily require consent from each individual in 486 
question.  487 
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(3) Whether one includes or excludes moral treatment from the scope of moral enhancement has 488 
implications regarding the medicalization of immoral behaviour and the desirability or undesirability 489 
of labelling (some forms of) immoral behaviour as a disease. Distinguishing moral treatment from 490 
moral enhancement has another implication. Anyone who accepts a distinction between moral 491 
treatment and moral enhancement has to, at least in theory, acknowledge a level of ‘average’ 492 
functioning or behaviour in order to distinguish treatment from enhancement. This brings with it 493 
significant difficulties as determining what is average functioning or behaviour inherently involves a 494 
normative decision. 495 
(4) Restricting moral enhancement to covering only effective interventions has implications for its 496 
moral justification. Classifying potentially non-effective interventions as moral enhancement needs 497 
additional justification compared to effective interventions since the beneficial effect can be regarded 498 
as an important justificatory reason for pursuing specific enhancement interventions.  499 
(5) Focusing on capacities versus behaviour as the target of moral enhancement may have important 500 
implications for one’s implicit or intuitive acceptance of the interventions in question. Certain 501 
interventions that can be considered immoral under specific circumstances (e.g.  physical or chemical 502 
castration by the criminal justice system in the Czech Republic), may appear more acceptable if 503 
framed under the label of ‘moral enhancement’. This could lead to certain ethically dubious practices 504 
being more widely accepted and more easily institutionalized. Moreover, the capacities/behaviour 505 
distinction also has important implications for the value of freedom in morality and whether or not 506 
morality requires ‘the freedom to fall’.  507 
(6) Passive enhancement interventions have the potential to circumvent an individual’s approval and 508 
may therefore more easily be considered controversial, especially if one considers society-wide 509 
passive enhancement (e.g. the addition of some kind of neurochemical to drinking water). Greater 510 
caution may thus be required when implementing passive interventions. Moreover, some normative 511 
ethical positions may not regard passive interventions as moral enhancements at all, and may 512 
therefore, justifiably or unjustifiably, exclude consideration of all passive means when moral 513 
enhancement is considered. 514 
 515 
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Moreover, the particular approach one takes to normative ethical questions may have important 516 
implications. For some utilitarian thinkers, if an intervention achieves behavioral control, this may be 517 
sufficient for it to be labeled a moral enhancement, whereas this is not likely to be the case for, for 518 
example, a virtue ethicist. For a rights-based ethicist, the ‘freedom to fall’ will typically be considered 519 
to be an essential part of morality. For a virtue ethicist, passive interventions do not amount to moral 520 
enhancements, whereas, provided certain safeguards are met, such interventions may count as 521 
enhancements for utilitarian ethicists and rights-based ethicists. These underlying normative views are 522 
important and may have a huge impact on one’s preferred definition of moral enhancement.  The 523 
capacities-oriented versus behavior-oriented approaches show, for example, how Harris would label 524 
some interventions that Douglas considers ‘moral enhancement’ to be examples of mere behavior 525 
control because in those examples the subjects lack the freedom to fall. Similarly, virtue ethicists may 526 
not consider certain interventions proposed by Douglas and/or Persson and Savulescu to be moral 527 
enhancements since some of these do not rely on the active involvement of the subject. If definitions a 528 
priori rule out certain forms of moral enhancement or a priori include interventions that would not be 529 
labeled moral enhancements by others, then this needs to be mentioned and explicitly acknowledged 530 
in order for the debate to be able to move forward in a constructive and open manner. 531 
 532 
This paper should not be read as a plea for one single and universally agreed upon definition. There 533 
are many different types of interventions for which the concept can be used. We believe there need be 534 
no problem with leaving ‘moral enhancement’ simpliciter as an umbrella term that may be used for 535 
many kinds of interventions, as long as one makes it sufficiently clear just how one is using the 536 
concept or what one is having it refer to and is aware of how one’s underlying normative position may 537 
influence one’s understanding of the concept. Our paper is also not a plea for a descriptive definition 538 
for, as we hope to have made clear throughout the paper, expelling all normative elements from such a 539 
definition is impossible. What we wish to emphasise is that most authors fail to identify the impact of 540 
their normative positions on their proposed definition of moral enhancement, and may thus, knowingly 541 
or unknowingly, portray their definition as neutral. This may lead one to believe that a given definition 542 
frames all the different aspects of the debate and all the different interpretations of what should and 543 
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should not be labeled a moral enhancement. Explicitly acknowledging one’s normative stance and 544 
how this might impact one’s views will likely ameliorate the current normative debate and provide for 545 
a more constructive approach to the question of the ethical desirability of specific interventions.”  546 
 547 
We hope that this paper will enable progress in the debate on moral enhancement, by providing a 548 
taxonomy of the many different definitions and uses of the term ‘moral enhancement’, which had been 549 
lacking to date, and by discussing several implications of particular definitions for the normative 550 
debate on moral enhancement. 551 
 552 
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